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I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over
time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective
action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the
optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study
how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of
parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members
via Security Council seats.
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The outcomes implemented by organizations depend, roughly speaking, on the members’ preferences
and the decision-making process. In economic theory, it is common to assume that the preferences are
exogenous. On the other hand, there is no justification to make the same assumption for the decision-
making process. However, a large proportion of the literature, especially in political economy, regards
the mechanism used to aggregate preferences as exogenous.1
I study the design of the decision-making process for an international organization.2 I propose a
repeated game with three elements that international organizations typically have. First, countries
cannot rely on external enforcers. Thus, any set of rules they use must be self-enforcing. Second,
members are heterogeneous; countries have large di↵erences in, for example, income, military power,
and natural resources. Some countries have a stronger opinion on global problems, and other countries
are concerned primarily about their local issues. Third, the organization cannot use or rely on
monetary transfers.3 Note that neither the absence of transfers nor the perfectly and unrestricted
use of them are realistic assumptions; in practice, organizations would be somewhere in between those
two cases. However, I want to examine the provision of incentives purely by choosing the appropriate
preference aggregation rule.
1See the literature review for examples of studies on endogenous voting systems.
2Although, the model could fit a broader class of organizations with similar characteristics, I will focus the exposition
on international organizations for two reasons: First, the structure of the model fits most international organizations,
while it is more di cult to argue that the assumptions in this paper resemble other types of organizations. Second,
as I will show below, under certain parameter conditions, the results of the model greatly resemble how the United
Nations distributes power among its members via Security Council seats; and to the best of my knowledge, there is
no other theoretical model that rationalizes the United Nation’s way of distributing power.
3This third assumption may seem the most restrictive of those in this paper. However, there are many reasons
to justify the absence of transfers. First, transfers are, in general, not openly used (if used at all). For example, the
United Nations Charter does not mention monetary transfers between countries as a means of compensating a↵ected
countries. There are studies (see, for example, Kuziemko and Werker (2006)) showing that being elected as a non-
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is correlated with foreign aid. However, foreign aid usually
entails several restrictions. For instance, the resources may be targeted (e.g., towards health, education), or there could
be implicit ine ciencies (e.g., bureaucracy, corruption). Additionally, transfers do not necessarily solve the provision
of incentives in a trivial way. Any transfer has to be self-enforcing itself, so countries have to be willing to comply
with any transfer prescribed by an equilibrium. This may introduce additional constraints, and as a consequence, it
is beyond the scope of the present study.
2
As a preview of the results, I will first find the optimal equilibrium. This optimal equilibrium
can be implemented via di↵erent equivalent mechanisms, one of them is voting weights. Then, I find
the di↵erences in the optimal equilibria under the entire spectrum of discount factors. Although a
folk theorem is valuable, I pay especial attention to parameter conditions that do not allow for the
e cient outcome to be implemented. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the members’ preferences allows
for di↵erences in the voting weights.4 This first result resembles some international organizations,
such as the World Bank or the European Union.
Later on (as a first step to show how rotation can be optimal in the Security Council), proposition
3 shows that random voting power can implement the optimal equilibrium. Moreover, to map more
closely how randomness and rotation are related, we need to add more structure to the model.
Therefore, in section 3, I characterize the solution under parameter conditions that mimic how the
United Nations was created. Namely, I divide the set of countries into two groups. One group is
composed of the creators of the United Nations, which I call the ‘mechanism designers.’ They have
a positive Pareto weight and (loosely speaking) a relatively higher cost of complying with costly
demands.5 The second group has zero Pareto weight and a relatively lower cost of complying.6
Then, I show that for a large range of discount factors, the optimal mechanism assigns voting
power only to a subset of countries (composed of both, the mechanism designers and the zero Pareto
weight countries). This distribution of power depends on the profile of preference shocks and re-
sembles a council (propositions 5, 6 and 7). Moreover, as discussed in corollary 1, there is a way
to attain uniformity in council size, regardless of whether the current shock is such that there is a
general agreement or opinions are divided.7 This mechanism is remarkably similar to how the United
4As shown in Maggi and Morelli (2006), with homogeneous members, a repeated game can explain supermajority
and unanimity as optimal equilibria.
5See lemma 3.
6Zero Pareto weight is just a benchmark. The results in section 3 would still hold for ‘small’ Pareto weights in the
second group.
7The size of the council can actually mimic the ten rotating members of the Security Council; see remark 2.
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Nations rotates decision-making power among the non-permanent members of the Security Council.8
The content of this study can be placed in three large categories. The first two are discussed
primarily in section 2: (i) I solve an optimal mechanism for an international organization, and (ii)
I show that this optimal mechanism can be mapped onto voting weights. The third category is
discussed primarily in section 3, where (iii) I provide further structure (parameters) that makes
the equilibrium very similar to the United Nations. Therefore, I will relate my contribution to the
literature on those three categories.
There are a few studies on endogenous decision-making rules. Broadly speaking, some of them
(including the present paper) focus on welfare-maximizing rules, and others focus on self-selective
rules. The paper most related to the present study is Maggi and Morelli (2006). One key di↵erence
from their paper is that here the members of the organization are heterogeneous. With this di↵erence,
I can provide one explanation for why some organizations use di↵erent weights for their members (such
as the IMF, World Bank, and European Union) and, more important, why some other organizations
have some form of randomness (implemented via rotation) in their decision-making power, such
as the United Nations Security Council. Another key di↵erence is that Maggi and Morelli (2006)
restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.9 In the present paper, it would not make sense to assume
symmetric payo↵s, since I allow for heterogeneous countries. Instead, I restrict attention to stationary
equilibrium payo↵s. Although in principle this restriction may seem strong, the reader should note
that homogeneous players plus symmetric equilibria implies stationary equilibrium payo↵s when
looking at optimal equilibria.10 A final key di↵erence from their study is that I allow the decision
variable to take values on a continuous interval. While this feature simplifies the maximization
problem, it also has desirable implications. Namely, this feature can be seen as a compromise between
8There are studies that model coalitions in two-stage voting games, which resemble a council. See Acemoglu et al.
(2012) and Eguia (2011).
9The same simplifying assumption is used inAthey and Bagwell (2001).
10More specifically, any optimal equilibrium is payo↵ equivalent to a stationary payo↵s equilibrium, as shown in
lemma 1 of Maggi and Morelli (2006).
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countries. Moreover, this compromise resembles Voeten (2001), who studies the bargaining power of
Security Council members as a function of outside options, and identifies a compromised level of the
decision variable that makes some countries indi↵erent between participating and not.
Aghion et al. (2004), Harstad (2005), and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) are other examples of studies
on e ciency and endogenous voting. Harstad (2005) has a result that captures one of the comparisons
between Maggi and Morelli (2006) and the present paper. Harstad (2005) proposes a static model in
which the decision-making rule is chosen prior to investment and the realization of preference shocks.
The needed supermajority rule (‘winning coalition’), broadly speaking, becomes smaller with the
heterogeneity of the players. This means that less ‘yes’ votes are needed, or it is easier to implement
an e cient outcome. In the present paper, I show in proposition 4 that even looking at discrete
choice mechanisms, there are discount factors where heterogeneity helps implementing an outcome
strictly better than the best static equilibrium.
Barbera and Jackson (2004), Koray (2000), and Laguno↵ (2009) are examples of studies that
investigate endogenous mechanisms by focusing on the stability of decision-making rules. That is, a
rule is stable if it would choose itself when voted on against other decision-making rules. In Barbera
and Jackson (2004), the self-stable voting rule is simple majority (or something very near simple
majority). In contrast, in the present study, the voting rule is state dependent, each country has
di↵erent weights, and the threshold for implementing an action is not necessarily 50% of the votes.
Koray (2000) shows that a unanimous, neutral and self-selective decision-making rule is equivalent
to dictatorship. Laguno↵ (2009) studies a repeated game in which the choice of a decision-making
rule is explicitly made. He shows that under certain conditions, the original game is equivalent to a
new game with one additional artificial player that acts as a preference aggregator. They then show
that social choice functions are self-selective when that artificial player is time-consistent.
Jackson and Yariv (2015), Schmitz and Tröger (2012), and Harstad (2010) study endogenous
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decision-making rules and focus on large preference spaces. Jackson and Yariv (2015) show that
when a set of heterogeneous consumers must agree on a common consumption stream, the only
way to aggregate preferences that satisfies e ciency and does not have a dictator must be time-
inconsistent. Schmitz and Tröger (2012) study optimality in a one-period game, where actions are
enforceable, and the payo↵s can take more than just two values. Harstad (2010) studies the choice of
representatives. He shows how a larger majority threshold (supermajority) can influence the outcome
towards a more conservative outcome.
The second strand of related literature is on voting weights. One of the earliest studies with a
structure similar to mine is Barbera and Jackson (2006). They show how the welfare-maximizing
weights of representatives in a democracy depend on preferences, population distribution, and size.
Ansolabehere et al. (2005) study voting weights among legislative coalitions. They find a linear rela-
tionship between parties’ shares of seats and their shares of cabinet ministries. Moreover, the party
that initiated the coalition gains a bonus advantage. Azrieli and Kim (2014) and Schmitz and Tröger
(2012) study a one-period game, with preferences belonging to a large set of possible values. They
focus on incentive compatibility because the payo↵s (from participating in the organization’s deci-
sion) can take more than just two values; however, they do not consider the problem of enforceability.
Those two studies, show that the optimal decision-making rule is a weighted voting system that can
be state dependent. This resembles my result for moderate discount factors. However, in their case,
the reason relies on incentive compatibility, which is not a surprising result (in the mechanism design
literature, when incentive compatibility is binding, the outcome typically depends on the preference
shock). On the other hand, in my work, incentive compatibility is not binding; instead, stochastic
voting power is a consequence of enforceability.
Among the empirical studies, Dreher et al. (2014) and Dreher and Vreeland (2014) are the closest
to my work. They analyze the determinants of elections on the Security Council, and show that
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GNP, population, and the number of years o↵ the Security Council have a positive e↵ect on the
probability of being elected as a non-permanent member. Their result is very similar to the present
work in two ways. First, country characteristics (such as GNP and population) should have a close
connection with preferences (and, arguably, the Pareto weights), which in the present model greatly
a↵ect the voting power of a country. Second, their ‘turn-taking’ variable indicates that the longer a
country is not elected, the more likely it is to become a member of the Security Council. This idea
relates to two of the extensions of the model: imperfect monitoring and non-stationary payo↵s. In
those extensions, a member that currently has no voting power knows that the decisions made at the
organization are poorly correlated with its own preferences; therefore, unfavorable actions are taken
with a high probability. This means that with a high probability, the organization has to promise a
higher voting weight in the future to such a country to secure its participation.
2 The Model
In this section, I will first describe the one-period game and then characterize the first best. Later,
I will describe the repeated game11 and find the mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of
payo↵s. As it is standard in the literature, I will focus on sequential equilibria in which coun-
tries condition strategies only upon publicly observable histories of actions: perfect public equilibria
(PPE).12 Moreover, I will restrict attention to stationary payo↵s. This restriction is a simplifying
assumption under which the (ex ante) payo↵s are constant over time. Nevertheless, stationarity of
payo↵s does not a↵ect the goal of this study, which is to rationalize the rotation on the Security
Council. As I will show, the model still has su cient richness to attain the remarkable results that
11The game presented here can be seen as either a repeated game in which nature plays first or a very simple
stochastic game in which the transition probabilities are independent of the current state and the actions.
12Note that although countries’ strategies will not depend on their private history, their strategies are allowed to
depend on the current private information. For example, see Maggi and Morelli (2006) and the ‘interim program’ in
Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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the optimal mechanism will have (i) stochastic voting power and (ii) a council of fixed size. At the
end of this section, I will discuss some extensions, including the case of non-stationary equilibria.
2.1 The Stage Game
There are N countries endowed with a binary action space; they can choose to either participate or
not in a (pure) collective action x. This means that, if everyone participates, the collective action is
e↵ective. Conversely, if at least one of the countries decides not to participate, the action fails, and
the status quo is preserved. At the beginning of the stage game, the state of the world realizes. This
state of the world will be denoted y = (y1, y2, . . . , yN) and is the profile of payo↵s of all members in
the case in which the collective action is taken. That is, when the collective action is e↵ective, each
member receives a payo↵ yi, which is independent across countries and periods.13 If the action is not
taken, all countries receive their status quo payo↵, which is normalized to zero. Country i’s payo↵
(yi) is privately observed and can take one of two values. With probability p, it takes a high value
yi > 0, and with probability 1 p, it takes a low value yi < 0. This induces a probability distribution
over preference profiles P(y) in the usual way. A country is in favor of (against) taking the action
whenever its payo↵ is higher (lower) than the status quo payo↵.
In a one-shot game, there are two (sequential) equilibrium payo↵s. Since countries cannot be
forced to take actions, the best possible equilibrium of the one-shot game is to implement the action
if and only if everyone agrees. This is called unanimity. The other equilibrium payo↵ can be attained
by never taking any action; this is an equilibrium because of the collective action assumption. Both
these equilibria satisfy the two relevant incentive conditions: Countries are willing to report their
preferences truthfully and are willing to participate by taking the action whenever the organization
13The independence of the shocks does not necessarily make the results of this study easier to attain. Indeed,
correlated shocks can more easily rationalize a council of representatives. However, I obtain this result even with
uncorrelated preferences.
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asks them to do so. In the next subsection, we will study the Pareto-e cient allocations, which
describe what outcomes can be implemented assuming that actions are enforceable.
Pareto E ciency As a first benchmark, let us define the Pareto-e cient rule for this model.
Given a profile of Pareto weights ( i), we will characterize the best outcome assuming that the








where x = 1 means to implement the action, yi(y) is the preference shock of the ith country in
state y. Clearly, it is optimal to take the collective action whenever the sum in the expression above








Note that if the decision rule is binary, the Pareto frontier consists of a finite set of points. If we
allow the collective decision variable x to take values on the [0, 1] interval, the Pareto frontier would
be convex. In either case, small perturbations in the Pareto weights do not change, in general, the
Pareto-optimal decision rule.
Assumption. The choice variable x can take values on the interval [0, 1].
14The reader may have noted that redefining a new support for payo↵s equal to ( iyi, iyi) could make the usage
of Pareto weights redundant. However, the previous transformation fails when  i = 0. This special case has the
interpretation that although a country has non-degenerate preferences, the organization does take that country into
account at the maximization problem. Moreover, since the country’s participation is necessary, the country should
still have some decision-making power in equilibrium. This is precisely the case studied in section 3, where only the
P5 UN members have a positive Pareto weight.
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2.2 The Repeated Game
The N members of the international organization interact repeatedly over time and discount time
using a constant factor  . From the payo↵ structure, there are e↵ectively three alternatives in each
period: take the collective action, preserve the status quo, or leave the organization. Therefore,
we can simplify notation by keeping track of only the action implemented instead of each country’s
individual participation.15 The public history in period t > 0 consists of the history of actions









initial period, the history is the null set. For a given country i, its interim payo↵ in the initial period
will be:
(1   )x0yi,0 +  
1X
t=1
 t 1(1   )E [xtyi,t|h1] (1)
where the expectation is taken over all histories following h1 = (x0,y0) . Let us recall that the
status quo payo↵ comes from not taking the action in the current period while remaining in the
organization. For simplicity, we can assume that receiving the status quo payo↵ forever is the same
as not having the organization at all.16 Thus, we can also set the outside option payo↵ equal to zero.
Finally, we also assume that pyi + (1   p)yi > 0. This assumption ensures that, on the equilibrium
path, the status quo payo↵ is strictly smaller than the payo↵ from having zero decision-making
power.17 These two assumptions avoid corner solutions but are not essential for the results of the
model. In this environment, a strategy for each country is a message (declaring its preference shock)
and an action that depend on the public history. Moreover, a PPE is a profile of strategies that are
15That is, instead of choosing a vector of individual decisions (d1, d2, . . . , dN ), which will e↵ectively implement an
action equal to min{di}, we can use the final output itself. Note that this works for both discrete and continuous
action spaces. Moreover, keeping track of the individual participation decisions potentially creates multiple equilibria
that are payo↵ equivalent.
16However, we could make the outside option di↵erent from the status quo payo↵. This is discussed in section 2.5.
17This would justify, for instance, all the countries that belong to the United Nations but have never been part of
the Security Council.
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mutual best responses to one another.
Note that a natural candidate for the payo↵-maximizing equilibrium is the Pareto-e cient alloca-
tion, together with grim trigger strategies. Moreover, grim trigger strategies are not an assumption.
Indeed, the best way to provide incentives is by punishing ‘o↵-the-equilibrium-path’ behavior in the
most severe yet credible way.18 Namely, after observing a deviation from the equilibrium path, the
organization is dissolved, and all members receive the status quo payo↵ forever. On the other hand,
the Pareto-e cient allocation may not always be part of an equilibrium; thus, I am particularly
interested in finding the optimal equilibrium in such situations.
2.3 A Mechanism Approach
We can regard the organization as a mechanism that collects preferences and suggests an outcome.
Therefore, I will use the terms ‘organization’ and ‘mechanism’ interchangeably. To simplify notation,
let us denote the recommended action by x. Therefore, x(·) will be a plan of actions that depends
on reported preferences and the public history. Given any mechanism, a member of the organization
will receive a payo↵ equal to the present discounted sum of the streams of all its payo↵s as defined
in (1). Moreover, there are three constraints to be satisfied. First, all countries must be willing to
join and maintain their membership in the organization. Second, all members must be willing to
participate by taking the action whenever the organization decides to do so. Third, the members
of the organization should truthfully report their preferences. Since the aim of the mechanism is to
provide incentives for behavior on the equilibrium path, unless explicitly mentioned, all the analysis




















 ⌧ tE⌧ [x⌧ (y⌧ ,h⌧ |ht)yi,⌧ |ht]   0, 8i, t,ht (3)





 ⌧ t 1E⌧ [x⌧ (y⌧ ,h⌧ |ht+1)yi,⌧ |ht+1]
!
  0, (4)
8i, t, yt,ht, and ht+1 = (ht, xt(yt,ht),yt)
and
E [xt(yt,ht)|ht, yi,t] yi,t   E [xt((y i,t, ŷi,t),ht)|ht, ŷi,t] yi,t, 8i, t, yt,ht, yi,t 6= ŷi,t (5)
Equation (3) is the voluntary membership constraint. It states that after every history, the
expected payo↵ of each member must be more desirable than leaving the organization, which I assume
yields zero payo↵ forever. Equation (4) is the participation constraint. It states that after every
decision made by the organization, the members must be willing to participate in the organization’s
decision. If the members comply, they receive an instant payo↵ and a continuation payo↵. The
sum of these two payo↵s must be at least as good as the alternative, which is to not participate
in the action and therefore receive the status quo payo↵ forever.19 Equation (5) is the truth-telling
condition: Members should truthfully report their preferences. Note that equation (5) already uses
the stationary payo↵s assumption; thus, the only way to provide incentives to report preferences
truthfully is through the payo↵s in the current period. Similarly, the equations above already use
the fact that on the equilibrium path, the most stringent credible punishment is to dissolve the
19The instant payo↵ they receive from not taking the action is zero, and the continuation payo↵ is the status quo
forever, as the organization is dissolved.
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organization and award zero payo↵s to all countries.
Lemma 1. The following three conditions hold:
i) The voluntary membership constraint (3) is not binding at the optimum.
ii) xt((yi,t)Ni=1,ht) increasing in each yi,t is a su cient condition for (5).
iii) The solution to (2) is an optimal equilibrium to the repeated game.
Proof. See Appendix A.
By using parts (i) and (ii) from lemma 1, I will guess that the optimal mechanism xt(yt, ·) will
be indeed increasing. Then, I will solve the simplified problem that maximizes (2) subject to (4).
Moreover, using part (iii) in the previous lemma, we know that the solution to this simplified problem
will be an optimal equilibrium of the repeated game.
2.4 Solution
To simplify the equilibrium solution, it is standard in the literature to decompose the payo↵s in
equation (1) into the sum of an instant payo↵ and a ‘future’ payo↵ of the form: (1  )x(y)yi+ vi(y).
In addition to strategies being best responses to one another, the profile of future payo↵s (vi(y))Ni=1
must belong to the set of sequential equilibrium payo↵s. Instead of using this method, I propose an
‘action-based’ approach, which fits more appropriately the environment considered in this study for
two reasons: action is one-dimensional and we restrict attention to stationary payo↵ PPE. Moreover,
this approach allows, in principle, to find an analytical solution. Although it may be impractical to
find a closed form solution, it can easily be solved numerically.20
Moreover, as we are restricting attention to stationary payo↵ equilibria, it is possible to compute
the solution to problem (2) by considering the following maximization problem:











(1   )x̃(y)yi +  
X
ŷ2Y
P(ŷ)x̃(ŷ)ŷi   0, 8i,y (7)
x̃(·) increasing
Lemma 2. The solutions to (6) and (2) attain the same payo↵. Moreover, let (x̃(y))y2Y be the
solution to (6). Then, there is an optimal equilibrium to the repeated game characterized by stationary
actions xt(·,ht) = x̃(·).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 greatly simplifies the maximization problem. The result is quite obvious: since we
restrict attention to stationary payo↵s, even in the case of multiple equilibria, there repetition of the
action schedule x̃(·) should be a solution. The following result is also standard in repeated games. It
states that for su ciently patient players, the e cient allocation can be implemented:
Proposition 1. There is a threshold  ⇤ such that if the discount factor exceeds that threshold, the
Pareto-e cient allocation is the optimal mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1. Note that if      ⇤, the solution to the problem under stationary payo↵s is also the
solution with unrestricted payo↵s.
The heterogeneity of the members provides a relevant extension to Maggi and Morelli (2006).
In their paper, countries are homogeneous, and therefore, if the Pareto-e cient outcome cannot be
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implemented, the optimal mechanism is unanimity. However, when the countries are heterogeneous,
it is possible to implement an outcome better than unanimity when   is small, even arbitrarily close
to 0.
Proposition 2. For any 0 <   <  ⇤, the optimal equilibrium delivers a payo↵ strictly better than
unanimity.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition for this is simple: Since x can take values between 0 and 1, there is always a convex
combination of the Pareto-e cient allocation and unanimity that is feasible. Therefore, the optimal
mechanism will deliver a payo↵ at least as large. Moreover, a similar result holds under some generic
conditions even if x can only take discrete values.21
Proposition 1 characterizes the solution to the maximization problem for organizations with pa-
tient members. However, proposition 2 only states that the payo↵s are somewhere in between e -
ciency and unanimity and that there is some degree of compromise: Some nations will forgo decision-
making power to provide incentives to other nations that are tempted to quit. We can take one step
further and study what the equilibrium will look like on the interval (0,  ⇤).
Let us propose an alternative and less abstract way of implementing an allocation in this envi-
ronment. Let us define a weighted voting rule as a profile of weights m and a target M such that
every country has a weight mi, countries vote on whether they want to take the collective action, and
the action is implemented if the sum of the weights of all members that voted in favor of taking the
action exceeds a target M . Otherwise, the outcome will be the status quo. Moreover, let us denote
 i(y) as the Lagrange multiplier of the participation constraint in problem (6) for country i in state
y. Then, we have the following.
21See proposition 4 in section 2.5.
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Proposition 3. When 0 <   <  ⇤:
i) The optimal mechanism can be implemented by voting weights that are state dependent and,
therefore, stochastic.
ii) The voting weights and target are given by:





( i +  E[ i])yi + (1   ) i(y i, yi)yi
i
(9)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Moreover, note that if      ⇤, the above mechanism can be implemented using voting weights
that are independent of the current state of the world. The previous set of results extend Maggi and
Morelli (2006) and allow for a relevant implication that was not part of their equilibrium solution:
random voting power. This is relevant because it provides a first step to rationalize via an optimal
mechanism the rotation of Security Council seats at the United Nations. Section 3 studies this topic
in further detail, where I restrict attention to a class of parameter conditions that resemble the
United Nations. However, before we turn to such a restriction of the model, let us analyze possible
extensions.
2.5 Discussion and Extensions
Outside Options Recall that we assumed that the payo↵s after the organization is dissolved is the
same as the status quo forever. Instead, we can assume that each member has a di↵erent outside
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option bi. The introduction of an outside option does not greatly a↵ect the equilibrium of the model,
but it may add testable implications.
First, the voluntary membership restriction could be binding22 in this case. Thus, we need to




In addition, the participation constraint must also be adjusted. The left-hand side represents
payo↵s on the equilibrium path, so it does not change; however, the right-hand side depends on two
terms: first, the instant payo↵ of not complying, which is zero, plus the discounted payo↵ of not
having the organization, bi.




Proposition 3 will still be valid, but the voting weights and target will depend on one additional
term that captures how binding the new restrictions are due to the introduction of the outside option.
Discrete Choice Mechanism Now we will study the case in which the choice variable can only
be discrete: x 2 {0, 1}. When this is the case, the threshold  ⇤ does not change, and the random
voting weights property still holds for   <  ⇤. On the other hand, it should be clear that there
are discontinuities in the organization’s value function (the solution to (6) as a function of  ). In
particular, there is a  ̃ > 0 that is the smallest discount factor that can sustain a payo↵ strictly
better than unanimity. The previous points are illustrated in figure 1.
Proposition 4. The following statements hold when the choice variable is restricted to belong to
{0, 1}:
22With the addition of an outside option, part (i) of lemma 1 is no longer true.
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Figure 1: Optimal stationary mechanism payo↵ as a function of  





(i) The threshold  ⇤ is the same as in the case of a continuous choice variable.
(ii) There is another threshold 0 <  ̃   ⇤ such that for any   below it, the optimal equilibrium is
unanimity.
(iii) Let  i be the minimum discount factor that satisfies country i’s participation constraint at the
Pareto-e cient allocation. A necessary condition for  ̃ <  ⇤ is that there are at least two
countries i and j such that  i <  j.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In words, part (iii) from the proposition above holds because if the discount factor is not large
enough to implement the Pareto-e cient allocation, the organization has to provide a more favorable
outcome to some countries. However, this means that some other countries will receive a payo↵ that
is lower than the payo↵ they would obtain in the Pareto-e cient allocation. For those countries to
still be willing to participate in the decisions of the organization, a minimum requirement is that they
have some slack in their participation constraint. That is, the minimum discount factor that would
make them still comply with the Pareto-e cient allocation is strictly larger than their actual discount
factor  i <  . Moreover, if the threshold for all countries is the same ( 1 =  2 = · · · =  N), it is not
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possible to ‘transfer’ some payo↵ from one country to another without violating their participation
constraints. In particular, this is the case when countries are homogeneous.
Imperfect Monitoring When the organization does not perfectly observe the participation of
its members but instead receives imperfect signals of the compliance of each country, grim trigger
strategies are no longer optimal. There are di↵erent ways to model imperfect monitoring. A simple
configuration would be that the final outcome x is not perfectly observed. Instead, a signal s 2
[0, 1] is publicly observed, and it induces a probability distribution Q(·) over the vector of country
participations d. More precisely, if two signals satisfy s < s0 and two vectors of country participations
satisfy d < d0, then Q(d|s) > Q(d0|s) and Q(d|s0) < Q(d0|s0).
Then, assuming that truth-telling is satisfied, a low signal would hint that perhaps countries who
declared yi < 0 may have defected. In principle, the decision made by the organization x should
depend on the history of observed signals. From Abreu et al. (1990), there is a recursive solution
to the equilibrium. In such recursive solution, the future payo↵ of a member will depend on some
combination of the most recent signal and the reported preference shock.
A more interesting configuration could allow for noisy public signals of each country’s compliance.
Let us consider two such signals. One signal can be labeled as the good signal : si,t and be highly
correlated with the country’s participation, and the other signal can be labeled as the bad signal : si,t
and be highly correlated with the country’s defection. For instance, the probability that the signal
is si,t when country i participated takes a value q > 1/2; and the probability that the signal is si,t
when the country has not participated takes a value of 1  q. Again, this model can be solved using
a recursive approach where a country’s future payo↵ will be increasing on its own compliance signal.
In terms of a voting mechanism, this means that the ex-post voting weight of a country will also be
weakly increasing in the country’s own compliance signal.
Non-Stationary Payo↵s There are two major changes relative to problem (2). First, the truth-
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telling condition can no longer be simplified. Second, the equilibrium guess xt(·,yt) = x̃(·) is only
true for      ⇤. This problem is much more di cult to solve and therefore is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, it is reasonable to say that one property of the optimal equilibrium is that the
voting weights are still random for a range of values of  , and in addition, they are history dependent.
A stronger conjecture would be that after two histories of the same length ht and ĥt such that for











Or roughly speaking, the longer a country that has received negative shocks and was requested
to participate by taking an action, the higher will have to be its promised future payo↵. In terms
of the voting mechanism, this would mean that such countries will have accumulated a ‘stock of
promised decision-making power’ over time; thus, in the future, this country will be less likely to
keep being requested to participate on states with negative shocks. Moreover, as we will see in the
next section, the random voting weights can be implemented by fully delegating decision making
power to a rotating council, at least in the case of stationary payo↵s. If this mechanism of power
delegation also holds in the unrestricted payo↵s case, the previously mentioned stock of decision
making power would imply a positive relation between the number of years outside the council and
the probability to get membership at the council. This property is in line with empirical findings in
Dreher et al. (2014).
3 Applications of the Model to the United Nations
Of all the international organizations, one of the (arguably) most influential and powerful is the
United Nations. It is composed of several organs (such as the General Assembly and the Security
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Council) and agencies (such as the IMF and the World Bank). According to its charter, the main
purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The organ devoted
to this specific task is the Security Council, which meets to propose and vote on resolutions that are
compulsory to all members of the United Nations.23 However, only fifteen countries, five permanent
and ten rotating (non-permanent), have the right to vote on the Security Council, from a pool of
193 members. The ten non-permanent members of the Security Council have a tenure of two years,
cannot be immediately reelected, and must have the support of at least two-thirds of all the other
members. In principle, this may suggest that there should be a better mechanism to choose the
decisions to maintain peace, as the preferences of most of the members are being ignored (more
information is usually better).
Two questions that arise from this voting setup are, first, why and under what circumstances
is it optimal to ignore the opinions of the majority of the United Nations members? Second, why
would members comply with resolutions on which they did not even vote? The simple answers to
those questions are that (i) to secure the participation of all members, some countries have to have
a high voting weight when they are tempted to defect, and (ii) members comply because the value
from remaining in the organization is still high enough that a current low payo↵ is bearable. In this
section, I will describe in greater detail the answers to these questions by mapping more closely the
theoretical model to the voting system of the United Nations. First, we will discuss veto power.
Then, we will find conditions that ensure a council-like voting system with rotation. Finally, we will
study heterogeneity within the rotating members.
23Country members are expected to follow Security Council decisions; otherwise, they could receive sanctions.
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3.1 Veto Power
If the Pareto weights of the five permanent members (P5) were initially very high, that could explain
why they must have veto power in every period. The historical explanation for the five permanent
members aligns perfectly with this assumption. The victors in WW2 decided to create an organization
with the mission of preventing war while guaranteeing their own power.24 Let us begin by studying




Now, to simplify the model, let us assume that there are NA < N members that have a Pareto
weight of  i = 1, while the rest of the NB = N   NA members have a Pareto weight of zero. This
special case is intended to capture the five WW2 victors that created, organized, and later invited
other countries to join the United Nations. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they had all
the Pareto weight.
Since there are two types of countries, let us also assume that each type has a di↵erent payo↵
structure: the first NA members have payo↵s in {yA, yA} and the remaining members have payo↵s
in {y
B
, yB} . Then, a member i will have veto power in the Pareto-e cient allocation if and only
if i  NA and (NA   1)yA <  yA. Moreover, for   smaller than but su ciently close to  
⇤, the
incentive constraints will be binding only for members without veto power (i > NA). In other words,
having veto power (i  NA) guarantees that a member will not be the first to have its participation
constraint binding as   decreases below  ⇤. This suggests the idea that the first NA members may
still have veto power for   <  ⇤. Next, I will state conditions under which this conjecture holds under
24For example, Bourantonis (2005) stated, “When the UN Charter was being drafted, the end of the Second World
War was still in sight, with easily discernible winners and losers. The intention was for the victorious states, which
were the world’s great powers at the time, to exercise global leadership with a view to managing or governing the
international system.... The overriding role of the Security Council reflected the strong desire of the founders of the




Lemma 3. If the following conditions hold, veto power is guaranteed when   <  ⇤:
i) pNByB >  (1  p)NByB
ii) NAyAyB <
⇣




Proof. See Appendix E.
The previous lemma is indeed easier to prove as a requirement for the results in the next section.
Therefore, its proof will be provided after the proofs of propositions 5, 6 and 7. Moreover, these are
su cient conditions, and not all of them are linked to each of the results. See appendix E for details.
3.2 Rotation
The next step is to study the rotation of Security Council seats when   <  ⇤, so that according to
proposition 3, random voting weights are part of the optimal equilibrium. Let xP be the Pareto-










Proposition 5. Assume that the conditions in lemma 3 hold. Then, there is a discount factor 0 <
 ⇤⇤   ⇤ such that for any   <  ⇤⇤, the optimal mechanism is characterized as x = x⇤⇤xP+(1 x⇤⇤)xU .
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that x⇤⇤ is a scalar. In words, this result states that the decision variable in the optimal
mechanism is a compromised level between the Pareto-e cient allocation and the unanimity alloca-
tion. Specifically, let us divide all states into three subsets: (i) when at least one of the first NA
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country members disagrees, it can still exert its veto power; (ii) when all of the first NA members
agree and at least one of the NB members disagrees, the action implemented is x⇤⇤; (iii) if everyone
agrees, then x = 1. Moreover, it is important to note that even in the case in which all of the first
NA members agree but the remaining NB disagree, the action is still partially implemented; this
might seem counter-intuitive. However, this is indeed optimal for   small. The reasoning is quite
obvious when one considers the action-taking constraint (7). When   approaches zero, the marginal
e↵ect that the action has on the incentive constraint via ‘future payo↵s’ (x̃) is negligible. Therefore,
all states are ‘equally impactful’ in terms of providing incentives. On the other hand, in some cases
 ⇤⇤ <  ⇤, and the linear combination x⇤⇤xP + (1  x⇤⇤)xU is no longer optimal for   2 ( ⇤⇤,  ⇤). Fur-
thermore, note that the first NA members still hold their veto power when   <  ⇤⇤. This characterizes
the optimal equilibrium for   small.
Although the previous result is robust, it is di cult to map it to any known voting system. x⇤⇤ is
arbitrarily small for   close to zero. Therefore, this mechanism approaches unanimity as   approaches
zero. As mentioned above, some international organizations do follow unanimity, such as the WTO
and NATO. One could argue that in those organizations, sometimes x⇤⇤ is implemented and labeled
as x = 1. Moreover, countries could ‘nominally’ all agree and vote in favor of x⇤⇤ with the implicit
threat that any action x > x⇤⇤ will be rejected.
The next step is to better understand the optimal equilibrium when   has intermediate values.
In what follows, let us study the cases in which  ⇤⇤ <   <  ⇤. The type of equilibria within this
region, which preserves veto power, can be divided in two parts, separated by a threshold  ̂ such that
 ⇤⇤   ̂   ⇤. Let Yk be the subset of states such all of the first NA members and exactly k of the





= NB !(NB k)!k! elements.
Let k0B be the minimum of:
i) The largest number k such that kyB + (NB   k)yB < 0.
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pk(1  p)NB k and E[yB|k] = (kyB + (NB   k)yB)/NB.
Proposition 6. Assume that the conditions in lemma 3 hold. Then, there are thresholds  ⇤⇤ = d0 
d1  · · ·  dk0B  dk0B+1 =  ̂ such that when   2 (dkB 1, dkB):
i) In the state where everyone agrees, x = 1.
ii) All subsets Yk such that 0  k < kB will satisfy x(y) = 0 for y 2 Yk, and the participation
constraints will be slack in those states.
iii) All subsets Yk such that kB  k < NB   1 will satisfy x(y) = x̂ > 0 for y 2 Yk, and x̂ adjusts
in such a way that the participation constraints will be binding in those states.
iv) x̂ increases in  .
Proof. See Appendix E.
In words, as   increases above  ⇤⇤, the state where all type-A countries agree and all type-B
countries disagree has a discontinuous fall to x = 0. Moreover, as   continues increasing, the states
where all type-A countries agree and only one type-B country disagrees will also have a discontinuous
fall to x = 0. These ‘falls’ continue occurring as   increases for all subsets Yk such that k  k0B. The
next result describes the outcome when   continues increasing above  ̂.
25Note that the summation goes until NB   1. Indeed, if the summation were to go all the way to NB , then part
(i) in this definition would be su cient for this second part.
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Proposition 7. There are thresholds  ̂ = dk0B+1  dk0B . . . d1  d0 =  
⇤
such that when   2
(dkB+1, dkB):
• All subsets Yk such that k < kB will satisfy x(y) = 0 for y 2 Yk, and the participation
constraints will be slack in those states.
• The subset Yk such that k = kB will satisfy x(y) = x̂ > 0 for y 2 Yk, and the participation
constraints will be slack in those states.
• All subsets Yk such that k0B+1  k  NB will satisfy x(y) = 1 for y 2 Yk, and the participation
constraints will be binding in those states, except at k = NB.
• x̂ adjusts in such a way that the participation constraints will be binding for states in Yk such
that k0B + 1  k  NB   1.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The previous result states that it is not optimal to set x = 0 in states such that such that
kByB + (NB   kB)yB > 0. Instead, x(y) will jump to 1, on such states, and x(y) will jump to some
x̂ > 0 in the states where k0B type-B members agree. Moreover x̂ is increasing in  , and once it
has reached 1 in those states k0B, x̂ > 0 will be implemented in states where all type-A and k
0
B   1
type-B members agree, and so forth. Moreover, note that it is possible to have some number kB such
that dkB = dk0B+1 or dkB = dk0B+1. Example 3 describes a simple case in which this situation occurs.
Finally, Appendix E provides a table with a graphical summary of propositions 6 and 7.
Furthermore, as   !  ̂, the states with k0B + 1 type-B members partially implement some x̂ > 0.
However, as   increases, it is no longer optimal to reduce the support (number of the states) such
that x > 0.26 Indeed, what determines dk0B+1 =  ̂ is the restriction x  1. Therefore, as   !  ̂,
26That is why the expression for dk0B+1 =  ̂ (see equation (22) in Appendix E) is di↵erent from the rest of the
thresholds dkB (see equation (21) in Appendix E)
26
x ! 1. When   >  ̂, all states such that all type-A members agree and at least k0B + 1 type-B
members also agree will implement an action x = 1. Moreover, there is a set of states characterized
by kB type-B countries such that x = x̂ < 1; the threshold kB decreases with  , meaning that the
action is implemented in more states.
Although the previous two results provide a very detailed characterization, they lack a useful
interpretation. Fortunately, there are equivalent mechanisms that seem more natural and can im-
plement the same allocations. Indeed, the next corollary provides an example of such mechanisms.
Namely, the mechanism proposed will be a council; that is, a subset of members are chosen as
‘representatives,’ and they vote in the hope of implementing the optimal allocation.
As mentioned above, veto power can be implemented using voting weights. Therefore, there is an
implicit way to obtain veto power. One immediate example would be to (i) set a council size equal
to NA; (ii) only NA   1 out of the first NA members can vote; (iii) one out of the remaining NB
members can vote; (iv) the (council’s) voting rule is unanimity; (v) in states where veto power would
be used, one of the NA   1 type-A members that would vote ‘no’ is elected as part of the council;
(vi) in states where veto power would not be used, but it is optimal not to implement the action,
one type-B member that would vote ‘no’ is elected as part of the council; and finally, (vii) in states
where it is optimal to implement x > 0, elect any NA   1 type-A members and one type-B member
that would vote ‘yes.’
On the other hand, since the United Nations uses explicit veto power, it is worth exploring in
greater detail mechanisms that explicitly use veto power. The following corollary characterizes a
large class of such alternative mechanisms:
Corollary 1. Consider the same conditions and notation as in propositions 6 and 7:
• The same optimal mechanism from either of those two propositions can be implemented by a
council-like voting system, where the first NA members always have the right to vote and have
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veto power, a subset Ñ of the remaining NB members will also have the right to vote, and a
number N⇤  NA + Ñ of council members must vote in favor to implement an action.
• The Ñ members rotate among the type-B countries. Although rotation is ex ante stochastic, it
is state dependent.
• For a given discount factor, let k( ) be the number that indicates the minimum number of ‘yes’
votes of type-B countries required to implement some x > 0. Then, the range of pairs (Ñ , N⇤)
that implement the optimal equilibrium satisfies:
max{0, k( )  1 + Ñ  NB} < N⇤  NA  min{k( ), Ñ} (11)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Remark 2. Note that for NB larger than 3NA, equation (11) is satisfied by setting N⇤ = 2NA   1
and Ñ = 2NA. This particular mechanism mimics the case of the United Nations Security Council.
The last point from the previous corollary, which is illustrated in remark 2, shows how the
optimal equilibrium can be remarkably similar to the United Nations Security Council. Although
the United Nations votes on several issues each year, this mechanism provides a good approximation
that rationalizes the rotation of the non-permanent members of the Security Council for one issue (or
one ‘aggregate’ issue). Namely, the firstNA members are equivalent to the P5, as they always vote and
have veto power. The action is implemented if all NA = 5 members and at least N⇤ NA = NA 1 = 4
of the remaining NB members agree. Moreover, only 4 type-B members with a positive shock are
required.
Note that it is perfectly valid to elect to the council members that have a negative payo↵. The
fact that in reality most of the resolutions are passed with unanimity does not necessarily exclude
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the possibility that some members disagree. Indeed, those members know that their vote will not
be pivotal, precisely because the council was carefully elected to implement certain actions. As a
consequence, they might as well vote in favor.27
Moreover, the United Nations’ charter states that “...The General Assembly shall elect ten (...)
Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard
being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the
maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization...”
28
This statement relates election to the Security Council seats to compliance with United Nations
objectives.
Another relevant stylized fact of the Security Council is that there is heterogeneous rotation. That
is, countries such as Japan, India and Brazil are part of the Security Council far more often than
other members. This behavior can be explained via heterogeneous payo↵s among the non-permanent
members. There is no reason to study such heterogeneity in a formal fashion, as the characterization
of the equilibrium with two types is already computationally complex. However, it is insightful to
verify numerically that the optimal mechanism can actually mimic such equilibrium. The next section
will explore that case.
3.3 Numerical Examples
Finally, I will provide two numerical examples. The first example will depict the equilibrium in
propositions 5, 6, and 7. The second example is intended to show heterogeneous rotation. To do so,
we will add one more type of country: type-C that will have a di↵erent support of payo↵ shocks.
Example 1. The simplest case to consider is three countries and one veto power holder: N = 3,
27This also relates to Downs et al. (1996), where they argue that there is a self-selection bias in the resolutions that
are voted. International organizations only discuss publicly the issues that they know will reach an agreement, and
omit issues that will never pass the voting process.
28(United Nations, 2015, ch. V, art. 23, p. 1.).
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NA = 1. We will numerically solve four scenarios. The first three have the same payo↵ supports:
For the type-A country, payo↵s are in { 2, 1}; for type-B countries, payo↵s are in { 1, 3/2}. The
di↵erence among the first three cases will be the probability distributions: p = 0.9, p = 0.6 and
p = 0.5. The fourth case has a payo↵ support on { 1, 3} for all countries, and p = 0.4. Figure 2
shows the optimal mechanism x for each of these four cases, for   2 (0, 1).
Figure 4.a shows the case when  ⇤ =  ⇤⇤. In the Pareto-e cient allocation, the unique type-A
country is a dictator. Thus when type-A disagrees, the optimal allocation is x = 0. As the discount
factor falls below  ⇤ = 0.47, since  ⇤ =  ⇤⇤, the optimal allocation equals x = x⇤⇤xP + (1   x⇤⇤)xU ,
and therefore, 0 < x < 1 in any state in which type-A agrees and at least one type-B disagrees.
In figures 4.b and 4.c, the conditions of propositions 6 and 7 hold, so type-A still has veto
power (the blue line stays at zero), but the optimal allocation di↵ers across states (yA, yB, yB) and
(yA, yB, yB) for   2 ( 
⇤⇤,  ⇤). Finally, when   <  ⇤⇤, the optimal equilibrium is again characterized
by x = x⇤⇤xP + (1  x⇤⇤)xU (the red and black lines merge).
Finally, in figure 4.d, the unique type-A country does not hold veto power for   <  ⇤⇤ since
the conditions of propositions 6 and 7 do not hold (the blue and purple lines are strictly above
zero). However, for a small enough discount factor  , the type-A country regains veto power, and
x = x⇤⇤xP + (1   x⇤⇤)xU is once again optimal (the red and black lines merge at x = x⇤⇤, and the
blue and purple lines drop to zero).
Example 2. For the heterogeneous rotation example, let us consider six countries: one ‘mechanism
designer’ , two ‘costly’ non-veto power holder countries and three ‘cheap’ non-veto power holder
countries . That is, N = 6, NA = 1, NB = 2, and NC = 3. The payo↵s are: yA 2 { 7, 1},
yB 2 { 5, 3}, and yC 2 { 3, 2}. Moreover,  A = 1,  B =  C = 0, and the probability of a positive
shock is p = 0.7. Numerically,  ⇤⇤ = 0.61 (a variation of proposition 5 still holds),  ⇤ = 0.92, and the
optimal mechanism grants type-A countries veto power for all discount factors  .
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Figure 2: Optimal x as a function of  









One type B disagrees
Two type B disagree
Type A disagrees
(a)









One type B disagrees
Two type B disagree
Type A disagrees
(b)









One type B disagrees
Two type B disagree
Type A disagrees
(c)









One type B disagrees
Two type B disagree
Type A disagrees, both type B agree
Type A disagrees, one type B agrees
(d)
Figures (a), (b) and (c) have preference shocks in { 2, 1} for type-A and { 1, 3/2} for type-B
countries. Figure (d) has preference shocks in { 1, 3} for all countries.
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I will select one particular discount factor that illustrates heterogeneous rotation. Let us consider
  = 0.83. Denote the number of type-j countries that agree with taking the action in any given
state as kj. Since veto power is optimal, we only need to consider variations in kB and kC . Table 1
describes the optimal action as a function of the state.




0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0.625
2 0 0.566 0.625
3 0.566 0.566 1
Similar to corollary 1, there are many di↵erent ways to implement this mechanism using a council.
In this example, I will describe one of them. Consider a council with four members. The type-A
country is a permanent member and holds veto power. Moreover, three out of four votes are required
to implement an action x > 0. The following table has inputs of the form (nB, nC) = (v1, v2, v3).
That expression should be read as follows: In a given state, nB type-B countries are part of the
council, nC type-C countries are part of the council, and their votes are (v1, v2, v3), which can be
either ‘yes’ y or ‘no’ n. The order of the votes represents the number of each type of voter. For
example, an entry (0, 3) = (n, n, n) means that all type-C countries are part of the council and all
vote ‘no.’ An entry (2, 1) = (y, n, n) means that two type-B countries and one type-C are part of
the council, and only one of the type-B countries votes ‘yes,’ while the rest of the council votes ‘no.’
With this notation, table 2 describes one possible council configuration that implements the optimal
mechanism:
Note that only the states in which x > 0 have two ‘yes’ votes, which in addition to the veto power
holder makes it possible to optimally implement the actions. Moreover, it is easy to check that when
x = 0.625, two type-B members vote in favor; however, when x = 0.566, two type-C members vote
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0 (2, 1) = (n, n, n) (1, 2) = (n, n, n) (0, 3) = (n, n, n)
1 (2, 1) = (n, n, y) (1, 2) = (n, n, n) (2, 1) = (y, y, n)
2 (2, 1) = (n, n, y) (1, 2) = (n, y, y) (2, 1) = (y, y, n)
3 (1, 2) = (n, y, y) (1, 2) = (n, y, y) (2, 1) = (y, y, y)
in favor. With this distribution of power, we can calculate the probability that each type will be
on the council, conditional on the event that A does not exert its veto power. Table 3 shows the
probability of each event and the probability that each type will secure a seat in each state:
Table 3: Probabilities of securing a seat on the council
kB
0 1 2
Prob of event kC
0 0.002 0.011 0.013
1 0.017 0.079 0.093
2 0.040 0.185 0.216
3 0.031 0.144 0.168
Prob of B to get a seat kC
0 0.002 0.006 0.000
1 0.017 0.040 0.093
2 0.040 0.093 0.216
3 0.015 0.072 0.168
Prob of C to get a seat kC
0 0.001 0.008 0.013
1 0.006 0.053 0.031
2 0.013 0.123 0.072
3 0.021 0.096 0.056
By summing the probabilities for all states, we can see that each type-B country has an ex
ante probability of securing a seat of 0.761, while each type-C country has an ex ante probability
of securing a seat of 0.492. Despite that B is a smaller group, the total voting power of type-B
countries is 0.761⇥ 2 = 1.522 seats on average; however, for type-C countries, the total voting power
is 0.492 ⇥ 3 = 1.477 seats on average. Finally, it is easy to check that, as expected, there is a total
of three (1.522 + 1.477) rotating seats in this configuration.
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4 Conclusions
To finalize this study, I wish to (i) summarize the results, (ii) provide detailed interpretations that
relate the findings more closely to what we observe in reality, and (iii) discuss further extensions.
We have studied the optimal decision-making rule for an international organization under stationary
perfect public equilibria. I showed how this optimal mechanism can be mapped onto a weighted voting
system. As a consequence, the voting system is endogenous to the model. Moreover, I discussed how
voting weights are fairly general in the sense that they can implement a large set of well-known voting
systems, such as one-country-one vote, dictatorship, oligarchy, and veto power. Under the optimal
mechanism, when the members are patient, the Pareto-e cient allocation can be implemented, and
therefore, the voting weights are constant over time. When the members are not very patient, the
decision-making power is state dependent and therefore ex ante stochastic.
Moreover, the study of ‘impatient players’ has several interpretations. It can be regarded as
countries literally valuing the present more than the future. On the other hand, for the thresholds
in most of the results, decreasing the discount factor has similar implications as decreasing the ratio
of the good payo↵ to the bad payo↵ ( y/y). This means that the type of equilibrium being played
does not only depend on the discount factor, which is probably uniform across organizations for each
country. Indeed, the type of equilibrium will vary from organization to organization because the
payo↵ structures are di↵erent. Thus, comparative statics on   can be mapped to comparative statics
on the payo↵s.
We also studied the case in which only a subset of the members have a positive Pareto weight
and showed the conditions under which they will have veto power under the optimal mechanism.
Moreover, for a moderate discount factor, the optimal equilibrium can be implemented by a council-
like voting system that resembles how the members of the United Nations rotate on the Security
Council. Specifically, I related the randomness in voting power to how the United Nations assigns
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power via the Security Council. In reality, this process follows a more complex protocol, so it is
worth discussing how the actual Security Council’s elections are held and how this mechanism can be
mapped onto my model. Every year, at the United Nations, a few members are nominated (by other
members or by themselves) as candidates for a seat on the Security Council. Then, all members vote
on each of the candidates. Finally, a candidate country is elected if it has the support of at least
two-thirds of all members.
Now, let me explain how this protocol relates to my model. There are three points to note:
First, it is possible that the preferences are revealed ‘informally’ prior to the election of Security
Council members. Moreover, following corollary 1, once the profile of preferences has been revealed,
all members already know what countries will be part of the Security Council and what action x
will be implemented. Second, as the preferences are known, the voting protocol for elections of
Security Council members is not the actual voting described in my model. Indeed, what my model
would say is that given the current state y, the mechanism requires country i to be on the council.
Therefore, the rest of the members will nominate i, give it a nominal/sympathy vote to elect it, and
then implement the desired action. Third, once elections have taken place, only the Security Council
members will participate in ‘formal’ voting on whether to take an action x, but from corollary 1, we
already know that the members of the Security Council were elected in such a way that their vote will
implement the desired action x. Moreover, recall that an action partially implemented, 0 < x < 1,
has the interpretation that members compromise on a Pareto-dominated action to satisfy all incentive
constraints. This ‘second best’ action x is the resolution voted on by the Security Council; however,
it is perfectly acceptable to nominally ‘discuss’ x = 1 and pretend some verbal bargaining.
I also presented a few extensions to the model, two of which are particularly challenging and
relevant for future research, namely, imperfect monitoring and unrestricted payo↵s. Both of them
have the property that the optimal voting weights will not only be random but also change over time.
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Moreover, both extensions have a testable implication for future research: The rotation of Security
Council seats depends positively on countries’ performance on past resolutions. In addition to the
testable implication that associates past performance with Security Council seats, country charac-
teristics also a↵ect voting weights. For example, military power might be an important determinant
of decision-making power at the United Nations but perhaps not very important at the World Bank.
Finally, although I focused on the rotation of Security Council members, the model could be
applied to other institutions. A perhaps cynical example would be that oligarchs in some countries
collide, and the political parties rotate power depending on stochastic preference shocks. The model
could also fit public good provision in environments where the good is repeatedly delivered, such
as how often the road to a village should be repaired. In general, the mechanism could be applied




A Proofs of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) If at the optimum, a member has veto power, then the action is only implemented
in states in which that country has a positive payo↵ (because that member is reporting truthfully at the
optimum). Therefore, the expected payo↵ of that member is a weighted sum of positive numbers and zeros.
Thus, it cannot be negative. Moreover, since the payo↵s are stationary, all future expected payo↵s are the
same and positive.
If a member does not have veto power, then there is at least one state in which the action is implemented
and the member has a negative payo↵. Therefore, from equation (4), the future expected payo↵ has to be
positive. Moreover, since the payo↵s are stationary, all future expected payo↵s are the same and positive.
Similar to the previous case, this has to hold for every expected payo↵ after every history.
(ii) x increasing means that x(y i, yi)   x(y i, yi) for all y i and i. Therefore, taking expectations over
y i, the inequality still holds. This implies that 5 holds.
(iii) Since the state space Y is finite, problem (2) has a solution. Moreover, restrictions (3), (4), and (5)
imply that any feasible mechanism is an equilibrium of the repeated game that has grim trigger strategies.
It only remains to show that there is no equilibrium of the repeated game that has a payo↵ larger than the
solution to (2). Let us assume that there is such equilibrium: x̂. This candidate for the optimal equilibrium
cannot have grim trigger strategies; otherwise, it could be characterized as a feasible mechanism. Then, let
us define a mechanism ˆ̂x that is identical to x̂ on the equilibrium path and has grim trigger strategies o↵
the equilibrium path. Since they di↵er only o↵ the equilibrium path, the payo↵s are unchanged. Moreover,
ˆ̂x will satisfy (3), (4), and (5), and therefore, it cannot have a payo↵ greater than the solution to (2).
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B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As it is standard in the literature, the equilibrium to the infinitely repeated game can be restated as
the mutual best-response of the two-period game with payo↵s: (1  )x(y)yi+ vi(y).29 The di culty is that
for any state y, the profile of payo↵s (vi(y))Ni=1 has to belong to the set of PPE payo↵s V . Moreover, the















(1   )x̃(y)yi +  vi(y)   0, 8i,y
x̃(·) increasing
vi(y) = vi(ŷ), 8i,y 6= ŷ (13)
(vi(y))
N
i=1 2 V (14)
where restriction (13) makes it explicit that the payo↵s are stationary and restriction (14) states that the
‘promised payo↵s’ are credible. In principle, we do not know what the set V is, but we can further simplify
problem (12) by noticing that its solution will satisfy
P
y P(y)x̃(y)yi = vi. Thus problem (12) becomes
problem (6). The claim that xt(·,ht) = x̃(·) is a solution to the repeated game follows immediately, given
that problem (12) is equivalent to problem (2).
29Abreu et al. (1990).
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C Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first focus on the action-taking incentive constraint; then, we will show that
the other incentive constraints are satisfied. Note that we only need to provide incentives to those countries
that disagreed on taking the action whenever x = 1:
(1   )yi +  vPi   0, 8i,y such that x(y) = 1
where vPi = E[x
P yi] is the Pareto-e cient expected payo↵, which is positive because we assumed that







. Finally, the desired discount factor will be the largest of each country’s minimal requirements:
 ⇤ = max{ 1,  2, . . . ,  N}. Whenever the discount factor is at least  ⇤, the participation constraints are
satisfied for all members.
The Pareto-e cient allocation is increasing in the preference shock: If y   y0, then y   y0; therefore,
from lemma 1, it satisfies the truth-telling condition. Finally, vPi 2 Vi, as the Pareto-e cient mechanism xP
can be sustained as an equilibrium with those same payo↵s.
Proof of Proposition 2. To show that the optimal equilibrium delivers a payo↵ strictly higher than unanim-
ity, it su ces to show that there is a feasible action x̂ that is strictly better than unanimity. To do so,
first consider a given 0 <   <  ⇤. Let vUi be the unanimity expected payo↵ of country i. Then, define
x̂(y;  ) = 1 for the unanimity state, x̂(y;  ) = 0 if the Pareto optimum allocation at that state is zero,
and x̂(y;  ) =
 mini{vUi }
(1  )maxi{ yi} otherwise. Note that by construction, E[x
Uyi] < E[x̂yi] < E[xP yi], where
xP is the Pareto-e cient action. Moreover, by construction x̂ satisfies the participation constraint, and
0 < E[xUyi] < E[x̂yi] implies that it satisfies the voluntary membership constraint. It only remains to show
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that it satisfies the truth-telling condition, but xP > 0 if and only if x̂ > 0 implies that x̂ is increasing in y,
and therefore, truth-telling is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a relaxed version of problem (6), without truth-telling and ignoring that

















(1   )x(y)yi +  
X
ŷ2Y
P(ŷ)x̃(ŷ|y)ŷi   0, 8i,y
Let us multiply the constraint by its respective Lagrange multiplier, normalized by the (strictly positive)








































Finally, we use the fact that under stationary payo↵s x(y) = x̃(y|ŷ) regardless of the previous period ŷ.
















Note that a preference shock can be rewritten as yi = ai(y)(yi yi)+yi, where ai is an indicator function
that equals one whenever the state y gives country i a positive shock. After some simplifications, we obtain
the desired expressions for the weights mi and the target M .30
Finally, the mechanism implemented by voting weights is increasing, and x(y) = x̃(y|ŷ) implies that x̃
belongs to the set of equilibrium actions.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) When      ⇤, the optimal mechanism is the Pareto-e cient allocation, which
is characterized by x being either 0 or 1.
(ii) By contradiction, assume that for every arbitrarily small  , there is a feasible decision x 2 {0, 1} that
delivers a payo↵ strictly higher than unanimity. Then, there is at least one country i and a state y such
that x(y) = 1, x(y)yi > 0 and y is not the unanimity state. Therefore, there is one country j such that
x(y)yj = yj < 0. For j, the participation constraint in that state requires (1   )x(y)yj +  E[xyj ]   0.
An upper bound for the expected payo↵ is that of dictatorship E[xyj ]  pyj . Finally, since x(y) = 1,
for   small enough (1   )y
j
+  pyj < 0; therefore, the allocation is not feasible.
(iii) If  ̃ <  ⇤, then for any discount factor in the middle  ̃ <   <  ⇤, the optimal allocation has a payo↵
strictly better than unanimity but strictly worse than the Pareto allocation. Assume that the individual
thresholds are all equal,  i =  
⇤ for all i. Then,   <  ⇤ implies that all countries have their participation
constraints violated. Therefore, any feasible x will implement the action in fewer states than would be




 iE[xP yi] but also E[xyi] < E[xP yi] for
every country. Since x 2 {0, 1}, (1  )xP (y)yj+ E[xP yj ] < 0 implies that (1  )x(y)yj+ E[xyj ] < 0
as long as x > 0. Therefore, the only state that would be feasible to implement is unanimity. However,
we considered a discount factor  ̃ <   <  ⇤, thus ruling out unanimity. Thus, a necessary condition for
this to hold is  i 6=  j for at least two countries i and j.
30Note that the  i values are pinned down by  i(y)
P
ŷ2Y P(ŷ)x̃(ŷ|y)ŷi = 0.
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D Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Using Kuhn-Tucker’s su ciency conditions, we need to find multipliers  i such that the proposed















































Moreover, to simplify notation, we will redefine the set of states. Let us denote any preference profile as
a partition of two smaller vectors: y = (yA,yB). By concavity,31 the relevant aspect of any vector yi is the
number of type-i countries with a positive shock. Let us denote that number as ki. Replacing the Pareto





1, NAyA +  NBE[ B]E[yB|NB] > 0
x⇤⇤, NAyA + (1   )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] = 0, 0  kB  NB   1
0, NAE[yA|kA] +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] < 0, 0  kA  NA   1, 0  kB  NB
(16)
Where  B(kB) =  i(y) > 0 (i) for a country i that is type-B, (ii) in a state y such that kB type-B
countries had a negative shock, and (iii) all type-A countries had a positive shock (and therefore it does not
depend on kA). E[ B] is the expectation of  B(kB). Finally, E[yi|ki] = (kiyi + (Ni   ki)yi)/Ni. Note from
(16) that the incentive constraints are binding only in states where all type-A countries agree and at least
31This is also the case since there is homogeneity within each type.
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one type-B country disagrees.




= NB !(NB kB)!kB ! , which we will use to compute the


















pkB (1  p)NB kB (NB   kB) B(kB)
NB
Let us define ✏ such that NAyA +  NBE[ B]E[yB|NB] + ✏ = 0. Next, we add this equation with the
rest of the first-order conditions where all type-A countries agree: NAyA + (1    )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +














NAyA + (1   )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB]
⌘






 pNyB   (1   )yB    pNAE[yB]
  (17)
and it is easy to verify that the denominator is positive when   <  ⇤. Now, it remains to check two more
conditions: (i)  B(kB) > 0 for 0   B(kB)  NB   1 and (ii) NAE[yA|kA] +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] < 0 for
0  kA  NA   1 and 0  kB  NB. To verify the first condition, we note from the middle expression in






we replace E[ B] from (17) to obtain the desired condition:
  <
 yB
 yB + pNAE[yB]  pNyB   PNA(1  pNB )yB
(18)
and again, it is easy to verify that the denominator is positive. Finally, to verify the second condition,
it su ces to check that (NA   1)yA + yA +  NBE[ B]yB < 0. Replacing the solution for E[ B] from (17),
we obtain an upper bound for  :
  <
 yB
 yB + pNAE[yB]  pNyB   P
NA (1 pNB )NAyA yB
(NA 1)yA+yA




 yB + pNAE[yB]  pNyB   PNA(1  pNB )yB
,  ⇤
 
E Proofs of Propositions 6 and 7, Lemma 3, and Corollary
1
Recall that kA and kB are the (state-dependent) number of type-A and type-B countries, respectively, in
favor of taking the action. With this notation, the following table summarizes the results of section 3:
Proof of Proposition 6. This proof is indeed extremely similar to the proof of proposition 5. It is clear that
when   <  ⇤⇤, the solution follows proposition 5. Therefore, we begin by setting  ⇤⇤ = d0. First, we assume
44
Table 4: Summary of propositions 5, 6 and 7. Optimal x as a function of  , kA and kB
kB
min   max   NB NB   1 . . . k0B + 1 k0B k0B   1 . . . 1 0
kA = NA
0  ⇤⇤ 1 x⇤⇤ . . . x⇤⇤ x⇤⇤ x⇤⇤ . . . x⇤⇤ x⇤⇤
 ⇤⇤ d1 1 x̂ . . . x̂ x̂ x̂ . . . x̂ 0
. . . . . .
dk0B d̂ 1 x̂ . . . x̂ 0 0 . . . 0 0
# . . . # . . .
d̂ d1 1 1 . . . 1 x̂ 0 . . . 0 0
dk0B 1 dk0B 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . x̂ 0
dk0B  
⇤ 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 x̂ ! 1
 ⇤ 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 1
kA < NA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
that k0B > 0; otherwise,  
⇤ =  ⇤⇤, and there is nothing else to prove. Then, we need to find a threshold d1





















1, NAyA +  NBE[ B]yB > 0
x̂, NAyA + (1   )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] = 0, 1  kB  NB   1
0, NAyA +  NBE[ B]yB < 0
0, NAE[yA|kA] +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] < 0, 0  kA  NA   1, 0  kB  NB
Similar to the proof of proposition 5, we add the previous first-order conditions, weighted by the prob-
ability of all events with kB type-B members agreeing and dive by NB:
P(kB)
NB
















The denominator is positive, which follows from point (i) of lemma 3 and the fact that   <  ⇤. Finally,
similar to the proof of proposition 5, we need to show that indeed each  B(kB) is positive for 1  kB  NB 1,
and it su ces to show that it holds for kB = 1. Therefore, from NAyA + (1    )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +









The denominator is positive. This follows from point (i) of lemma 3 and the fact that k0B > 0. The
next step is to show that it is optimal to give veto power to the first NA members. It su ces to show that











where the expression   NAyA(NA 1)yA+yA
yB is positive since (NA   1)yA + yA is negative. It follows from
point (i) of lemma 3 that the denominator is positive. In addition, similar to the proof of proposition 5, we





P(kB)(E[yB |kB ] E[yB |1])
, then d0 = d1 = · · · =  ̂
Finally, we need to show that 0  x̂  1. This will indeed give us a non-binding lower bound for  .









= 0. It follows
from part (ii) in the definition of k0B that this condition is satisfied.
The last step is to generalize the previous analysis to all thresholds dkB . To do this, note that (19) will
become:








and it is increasing in kB  k0B. However, note that we need to define thresholds up to k0B +1. However,
at k0B + 1 the summation
PNB 1
k=k0B+1
P(k)E[yB|k] actually decreased from k0B, since E[yB|k0B + 1] > 0. The
last threshold  ̂ comes from another restriction, which is x  1. From the definition of k0B:












yB is decreasing in kB, and point (ii) of lemma 3 was assumed.
Proof of Proposition 7. Similar to the previous two proofs, let us define  ̂ = dk0B+1, and we need to find dk0B




















1, NAyA +  NBE[ B]yB > 0
1, NAyA + (1   )(NB   kB) B(kB)yB +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB]   0, k
0
B + 1  kB  NB   1
x̂, NAyA +  NBE[ B]E[yB|k0B] = 0
0, NAyA +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB]   0, 0  kB  k0B   1
0, NAE[yA|kA] +  NBE[ B]E[yB|kB] < 0, 0  kA  NA   1, 0  kB  NB
(23)
In this case, it is more convenient to start by finding conditions such that 0 < x̂ < 1. The participation
constraints in states when x = 1 are (1   )y
B
+  E[xyB] = 0. Therefore, E[xyB] =  1    yB. Now, we use















From the previous equation, we can solve for x̂:
x̂ =

























and the thresholds are well defined and follow the right order since E[yB|k0B] < 0 from the definition of
k0B. The next condition we need to check is that  B   0. Similar to the proof of proposition 6, the third




Additionally, we can add up all expressions with  B(kB), weighted by
P(kB)
NB
; but now we do so to obtain



































However, it is easy to check that (24) is a more restrictive condition. Moreover, note that the lower
bound in (24) is precisely  ̂. Finally, we want to ensure that veto power still holds. As before, it su ces
to show that the last condition in equation (23) holds for the case kA = NA   1 and kB = NB. That is,
(NA   1)yA + yA +  E[ B]NByB < 0. This inequality holds when:
NAyAyB <
⇣
(NA   1)yA + yA
⌘
E[yB|k0B] (25)
However, the second condition in lemma 3 is su cient for (25).













(NA   1)yA + yA
⌘
E[yB|kB] holds for any kB  k0B; therefore, veto power is optimal.
Note that d0 =  ⇤, since it is the threshold needed to implement the action x = 1 in every state in which all
type-A countries agree.
Proof of Lemma 3. All conditions stated in lemma 3 have been used at least once during the proofs of
propositions 6 and 7; moreover, no additional assumptions were made. Therefore, these are su cient
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conditions.
Proof of Corollary 1. It su ces to show the source of equation (11). Note that if there is a council of
size NA + Ñ , the threshold to implement an action cannot exceed the total number of votes. Therefore,
N⇤  NA + Ñ . Moreover, k( ) is the minimum number of ‘yes’ votes that can be selected in a state such
that it is optimal to implement some action x > 0. As a consequence, N⇤  NA + k( ). From these two
conditions, we obtain that:
N⇤  NA  min{k( ), Ñ}
On the other hand, some voting power must be given to type-B countries; otherwise, type-A countries
would always implement the Pareto-e cient allocation. Therefore, N⇤ > NA. Finally, we wish to ensure
that we can find enough ‘no’ votes whenever it is optimal to preserve the status quo. In particular, we
seek to satisfy that conditions in states k( )   1. In such states, there number of ‘yes’ votes coming from
type-B countries cannot exceed N⇤   NA. If there are Ñ type-B council members, and we can find at
most NB   (k( )   1) ‘no’ votes, we need that Ñ   (NB   (k( )  1)) < N⇤  NA. From the previous two
conditions:
max{0, k( )  1 + Ñ  NB} < N⇤  NA
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